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Fare well, Justice Kirby 
Abstract 
Who can believe it? ‘The great dissenter’, the judge with a Facebook site dedicated to him,1 the person 
known affectionately to his associates as ‘our Judge’, Justice Michael Kirby has reached the end of his 
federal judicial tenure. Justice Kirby has turned 70 and, as required by section 72 of the Constitution, must 
leave his office in the High Court of Australia. Analysis of the Judge’s jurisprudential influence will flow 
soon enough. This piece is instead a reflection on the experiences of his associates to provide some 
different insights, such as into the workings of his High Court chambers. Those chambers consisted of a 
small team — the Judge, his indomitable personal assistant Janet Saleh and the two associates. There 
was never any doubt that the associates (who changed annually) were the least expert of the four. But 
between the Judge and his PA, no-one can say who had the upper hand. Janet, may you enjoy your 
retirement (that coincides with the Judge’s) and may ‘The Edit Queen’ live on for many happy years 
without ever having to see another ‘edit’. 
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Who	can	believe	it?	‘The	great	dissenter’,	the	judge	
with	a	Facebook	site	dedicated	to	him,1	the	person	
known	affectionately	to	his	associates	as	‘our	Judge’,	
Justice Michael Kirby has reached the end of  his federal 
judicial	tenure.	Justice	Kirby	has	turned	70	and,	as	
required by section 72 of  the Constitution, must leave 
his	office	in	the	High	Court	of 	Australia.
Analysis	of 	the	Judge’s	jurisprudential	influence	will	flow	
soon	enough.	This	piece	is	instead	a	reflection	on	the	
experiences	of 	his	associates	to	provide	some	different	
insights,	such	as	into	the	workings	of 	his	High	Court	
chambers.	Those	chambers	consisted	of 	a	small	team	
—	the	Judge,	his	indomitable	personal	assistant	Janet	
Saleh	and	the	two	associates.	There	was	never	any	
doubt	that	the	associates	(who	changed	annually)	were	
the	least	expert	of 	the	four.	But	between	the	Judge	and	
his	PA,	no-one	can	say	who	had	the	upper	hand.	Janet,	
may	you	enjoy	your	retirement	(that	coincides	with	the	
Judge’s)	and	may	‘The	Edit	Queen’	live	on	for	many	
happy	years	without	ever	having	to	see	another	‘edit’.
The well-known workaholic
A	Kirby	associate’s	average	day	shows	the	breadth	and	
volume	of 	work	that	travelled	through	those	chambers.	
Most	High	Court	associates	work	exclusively	on	
judgments.	In	addition	to	the	Kirby	judgment-load	
(often	greater	in	page	numbers	than	in	other	chambers)	
the	Kirby	associates	had	to	arrange	travel,	cups	of 	tea,	
lunches	for	numerous	people,	handle	dozens	of 	pieces	
of 	correspondence	and	dabble	in	some	typing.	You	
name	it,	we	did	it.	
Although	our	workload	sometimes	felt	overwhelming,	
the	following	anecdote	from	Edward	Brockhoff2	shows	
that	the	Judge	worked	more	than	we	did,	managing	to	
fit	in	an	extraordinary	amount	of 	extra-judicial	activity:
I	once	accompanied	the	Judge	on	a	trip	to	Adelaide.	He	was	
there	for	exactly	24	hours.	In	that	time,	he	delivered	a	speech	
at	a	gala	dinner	for	law	students;	a	speech	at	a	breakfast	
for	young	lawyers;	attended	a	graduation	ceremony;	dined	
with	law	faculty;	delivered	speeches	at	two	universities	
and	attended	an	opening	of 	barristers’	chambers.	I	was	
exhausted.	The	Judge	was	just	getting	started.
Strength against opposition
The	workload	was	particularly	challenging	in	2002,	
due	to	two	external	factors.	The	first	was	Gaudron	J’s	
retirement,	which	required	all	outstanding	judgments	to	
be	delivered	before	her	departure.	The	second,	being	
the	more	trying	of 	the	two,	was	referred	to	by	Kirby	J	
in	a	message	inscribed	to	me	at	the	end	of 	my	year:
The	year	2002	had	its	dark	side	—	in	the	Court	and	in	the	
world.	The	events	of 	March	12th	will	be	written	on	our	
hearts	—	like	s	92	of 	the	Constitution	was	written	on	the	
heart	of 	Latham	CJ.	But	like	the	old	jurisprudence	of 	s	
92,	these	events	and	all	else	pass	away…	When	you	look	
back	on	your	time	in	the	High	Court	of 	Australia	think	of 	
the	earnestness	and	bright	spirit	with	which	we	tackled	so	
much	together.
The	‘dark	side’	to	which	the	Judge	referred	was	the	
scandalous	(and	subsequently	unreservedly	withdrawn)	
allegations	made	by	Senator	Heffernan	under	the	veil	
of 	parliamentary	privilege.	In	the	wake	of 	Heffernan’s	
attack,	Kirby	J	received	thousands	of 	emails,	letters	
and	phone	calls.	All	but	a	handful	of 	these	were	
expressions	of 	support	in	response	to	what	Robert	
Manne	described	as	‘the	most	virulent	expression	of 	
homophobia	Australian	public	life	had	witnessed	in	very	
many	years’.3
Characteristically,	on	the	morning	following	the	
allegations,	Kirby	J	did	not	let	them	distract	him	from	
his	work.	He	continued	with	his	judicial	and	extra-
judicial	activities	and	quickly	set	about	responding	to	
every	piece	of 	correspondence	he	had	received.	
Walking the talk
Perhaps	in	response	to	having	experienced	
discrimination,	Kirby	J	sought	to	assist	others	in	
overcoming	barriers	to	success.	This	was	especially	
true	of 	his	method	of 	recruiting	associates	—	much	
sought-after	positions	which	help	open	doors	into	
academia	and	private	practice.	Unlike	most	High	
Court	judges,	who	relied	upon	recommendations	and	
unsolicited	applications,	Kirby	J	advertised	at	every	
Law	School	in	the	country.	Without	compromising	on	
standards,	he	actively	sought	to	employ	students	from	
regional	or	smaller	universities.	
Justice	Kirby	thereby	opened	up	the	opportunity	to	all	
students.	This	can	be	contrasted	with	another	judge	
who	has	acknowledged	that	he	could	be	accused	of 	
bias	towards	certain	universities,	but	stated	that	he	
could justify his choice of  associates on the basis of  
‘merit’.	Justice	Kirby’s	process	meant	that	he	also	
reached	out	to	those	equally	‘meritorious’	applicants	
who	had	no	relationship	with	the	legal	community	and	
who	may	not	even	have	known	that	the	otherwise	
unadvertised	positions	existed.
The	contrast	between	Kirby	J’s	open	recruitment	process	
and	the	approach	adopted	by	many	on	the	Court	mirrors	
that	which	often	emerged	between	their	respective	
approaches	to	the	law.	This	contrast	is	revealed	in	the	
following	anecdote	from	Katharine	Young.4 
I	have	a	memory	of 	the	judge	explaining	his	interpretive	
theory of  the Constitution.	‘I’m	a	Maximalist,	Katie’	he	said,	
thrusting	his	arms	in	the	air	as	if 	embracing	the	world.	
‘Many	on	the	court	are	Minimalist,	but	I’m	a	Maximalist.’
Judicial ‘rock star’ 
All	the	Kirby	associates	soon	realised,	if 	they	hadn’t	
been	aware	of 	it	before	their	appointment,	that	Kirby	
ON MICHAEL KIRBY
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J	has	a	huge	fan	club	(as	well	as	some	detractors).	This	
celebrity	was	nowhere	more	evident	than	when	he	
visited	Australian	universities.	I	recall	students	asking	
him	to	sign	anything	from	a	copy	of 	the	Constitution to 
the	shirt	on	their	back,	which	was	often	printed	with	a	
logo	such	as	‘We	Love	Kirby’	or	‘Kirby	Rocks’.	
What	was	more	surprising	to	me	was	his	interaction	
with	other	public	figures.	One	day,	waiting	for	a	plane	
in	Canberra	and	sitting	in	the	Qantas	Lounge	with	
the	Judge,	I	saw	the	Dalai	Lama.	The	Judge	asked	if 	
I’d	ever	met	the	spiritual	leader	of 	Tibet,	to	which	
I,	not	surprisingly,	answered	‘no’.	In	response,	the	
Judge	invited	the	Dalai	(with	whom	he	obviously	had	a	
friendship)	to	join	us,	introduced	me	and	engaged	in	an	
inclusive	discussion.	I	never	imagined	such	an	experience	
to	be	part	of 	the	job	description	of 	judge’s	associate.
Humanity
The last stories I relate convey the humanity of  Kirby 
J.	The	warmth	and	sociability	of 	the	Judge	is	well-
known,	and	demonstrated	to	me	through	his	interest	
in	my	family.	He	came	to	dinner	at	my	house	to	meet	
them	and	sends	his	best	wishes	to	them	whenever	I	
see	him.	During	Court	sittings,	he	would	always	invite	
my	partner	(now-husband)	to	the	monthly	Judge	and	
associate	dinners.	In	each	of 	his	years	on	the	Court,	
Kirby	J	invited	his	past	and	present	associates	and	
their	partners	to	celebrate	his	birthday	with	him.	
Most recently, that invitation extended to my then 10-
month-old	daughter.
Justice	Kirby	expected	a	lot	from	his	associates,	but	was	
never	unreasonable.	Andrew	Leigh	remembers	the	day	
he	forgot	to	bring	a	judgment	to	Court	when	Kirby	J	
was	to	deliver	it:5
It	was	my	first	month	on	the	job.	I	was	standing	behind	the	
Judge’s	chair	in	Courtroom	No	1	when	he	asked	‘Where	
is	it?’	My	stomach	turned	over	as	I	realised	my	omission	
—	I	had	forgotten	the	judgment.	I	wanly	whispered	that	I	
could	give	him	a	pile	of 	papers	that	might	look	to	the	rest	
of 	the	courtroom	like	a	real	judgment.	He	firmly	replied	
‘No’.	I	briskly	walked	from	the	courtroom	in	the	hope	that	
I	might	get	up	to	chambers	and	back	with	the	judgment	in	
time.	Needless	to	say,	I	failed,	and	the	transcript	for	the	
morning	reads:	
‘Kirby	J:	I	concur	with	Chief 	Justice	Brennan,	and	will	
deliver	my	reasons	when	they	arrive.’	
I	expected	him	to	be	furious	at	lunchtime,	but	he	graciously	
accepted	my	apologies,	smiled	and	said	‘We	all	make	
mistakes	Andrew’.
Justice	Kirby’s	humanity	was	also	evident	in	his	dealings	
with	the	international	community,	as	remembered	by	
Katharine	Young:
In	2006,	Kirby	J	gave	a	keynote	address	to	an	international	
gathering	of 	judges	at	Harvard	Law	School.	The	setting	
was	very	serious	and	formal,	perhaps	even	a	trifle	
conservative.	Justice	Kirby’s	speech	described	the	trend	
of 	judges	citing	each	other’s	opinions	and	learning	about	
each	other’s	systems	of 	law	and	about	international	law:	
a	trend,	of 	course,	which	he	was	part	of 	setting.	Towards	
the	end	of 	the	speech,	the	subject	turned	to	the	human	
rights	implications	of 	same-sex	marriage.	Justice	Kirby	gave	
an	expert	summary	of 	equality	jurisprudence,	and	then	
mentioned	his	and	his	partner	Johan’s	thoughts	on	marriage.	
It	was	a	celebration	of 	judicial	candour,	as	well	as	of 	equality	
in	the	law,	and	I	doubt	it	will	be	forgotten	by	many	of 	the	
judges,	law	professors	and	students	present.
Fare well
Justice	Kirby	will	be	remembered	as	a	unique	justice	
of 	the	High	Court	of 	Australia.	His	associates	will	
remember him as an extraordinary boss and the 
time	working	for	him	as	fascinating,	demanding	and	
sometimes	surprising.	I’m	sure	we	will	all	hear	about	his	
activities	post-judicial	office.	From	all	of 	us,	Judge,	fare	
well	but	not	farewell.
ELISA ARCIONI	was	Justice	Kirby’s	associate	in	
2002/2003.	She	is	currently	a	lecturer	in	law	at	the	
University	of 	Wollongong.
© 2009 Elisa Arcioni
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Graduate	Fellow,	Edmond	J	Safra	
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5.	Andrew	was	Justice	Kirby’s	associate	
in	1997/1998	and	is	currently	Associate	
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•	Providing	financial	and/or	tax	incentives	for	RRR	
students	and	lawyers;
•	Addressing	salary	levels	and	working	conditions	
within	CLCs;
•	Responding	to	demographic	change	and	need	within	
the	legal	profession;	and,	
•	Increasing	the	commitment	of 	public	sector	funding	
to	legal	service	provision.
TRISH MUNDY	teaches	law	at	Griffith	Law	School	 
on	the	Gold	Coast.	
This	article	reports	on	the	findings	of 	a	more	detailed	
report,	completed	in	July	2008,	which	was	initiated	
by	the	Northern	Rivers	Community	Legal	Centre	and	
supported	by	the	NSW	Law	&	Justice	Foundation.	The	
full	report	can	be	found	at	<nrclc.org.au/SiteMedia/
w3svc728/Uploads/	Documents/RecruitmentRetentio
nOfLawyers.pdf>.
‘Recruiting and Retaining …’	continued	from	page	35
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In	a	recent	trivia	quiz	on	law	reform	and	social	justice,	I	
had	to	warn	contestants	that,	despite	their	instincts,	the	
answer	to	four	of 	the	10	questions	was	not	‘Michael	
Kirby’.	The	answer	to	one	was;	the	answers	to	the	
other	three	were	Lionel	Murphy,	Isaac	Isaacs	and	
Professor	Michael	Coper.
But	here	is	a	question	I	didn’t	ask,	to	which	‘Michael	
Kirby’	is	the	answer:	‘Which	High	Court	judge	has	
referred	to	Alternative	Law	Journal	articles	in	their	
decisions	more	often	than	any	other	judge?’	The	only	
other	judges	to	do	so	are	Brennan	CJ,	McHugh	J	and	
Murphy	J	(once	each),	the	latter	two	referring	to	the	
journal	when	it	was	the	Legal	Service	Bulletin	(in	Pollitt 
v R	[1992]	HCA	35;	(1992)	174	CLR	558	and	Koowarta 
v Bjelke-Petersen	[1982]	HCA	27;	(1982)	153	CLR	168	
respectively).	
Negligence
Chief 	Justice	Brennan’s	reference	was	in	the	same	case,	
and	to	the	same	article,	as	the	first	of 	the	eight	cases	in	
which	Kirby	J	referred	to	the	Alternative	Law	Journal;	
Romeo v Conservation Commission of  the Northern 
Territory	[1998]	HCA	5,	(1998)	192	CLR	431.	Justice	
Kirby	was	one	of 	five	judges	who	dismissed	an	appeal	
and	confirmed	that	a	young	woman,	aged	16,	who	had	
fallen	in	a	nature	reserve	and	become	a	paraplegic,	
was	not	entitled	to	damages	from	a	public	authority.	In	
an	earlier	High	Court	decision,	Nagle v Rottnest Island 
Authority	[1993]	HCA	43,	(1993)	177	CLR	423,	a	public	
authority	had	been	held	liable	in	similar	circumstances.	
The Nagle	decision	was	controversial,	and	was	
criticised	by	Sandra	Berns	in	an	Opinion	piece,	‘Judicial	
paternalism	and	the	High	Court’	(1993)	18	Alt LJ	202.	
Berns’	view	was	that	‘Nagle	imposes	an	unrealistic	
standard	of 	care	on	public	authorities’,	and	that	‘[t]he	
court’s	paternalistic	attitude	is	truly	remarkable’.	Justice	
Kirby noted the criticisms of  Nagle and referred to the 
Berns’	Opinion,	but	for	purposes	of 	deciding	Romeo he 
distinguished	Nagle	on	its	facts.	Chief 	Justice	Brennan,	
who	had	dissented	in	Nagle,	cited	Berns’	Opinion	
and,	alone	of 	the	seven	judges,	said	Nagle should be 
overruled.	
The race power
Three months after the decision Romeo,	the	High	Court	
decided	the	important	‘Hindmarsh	Island	Bridge	case’,	
Kartinyeri v Commonwealth	[1998]	HCA	22,	(1998)	
195	CLR	337.	Justice	Kirby	was	in	sole	dissent.	At	
issue	was	the	constitutional	validity	of 	legislation	that	
removed	the	protection	against	development	that	the	
Heritage Protection Act	offered	to	aboriginal	land.	The	
majority	view	was	that	the	legislation	was	valid	under	
the	‘race’	power:	s	51(xxvi)	of 	the	Constitution.	In	Kirby	
J’s	view,	the	race	power	did	not	extend	to	a	law	that	
‘is	detrimental	to,	and	adversely	discriminates	against,	
people	of 	the	Aboriginal	race	of 	Australia	by	reference	
to	their	race’.	
In	recounting	the	background	to	the	litigation,	
particularly	a	failed	challenge	against	a	South	Australian	
Royal	Commission	into	the	indigenous	claims	
concerning	Hindmarsh	Island,	Kirby	J	referred	to	
Maureen	Tehan’s	article,	‘A	tale	of 	two	cultures’	(1996)	
21 Alt LJ	10,	in	which	Tehan	gives	an	account	of 	legal	
and	related	events	in	the	long-running	case,	including	
the	political	background,	the	Federal	Court	cases,	and	
Royal	Commission	inquiry	and	findings.
Battered woman syndrome
At the end of  the same year, 1998 — a busy one for 
the	Alternative	Law	Journal	in	the	High	Court	—	Kirby	
J	was	part	of 	a	narrow	(3:2)	majority	in	Osland v R 
[1998]	HCA	75,	(1998)	197	CLR	316,	upholding	
the conviction of  Heather Osland for the murder of  
her	husband.	Mrs	Osland’s	appeal	relied	in	part	on	
directions	given	by	the	trial	judge	on	the	defences	
of 	provocation	and	self-defence	as	they	related	to	
battered	woman	syndrome.	On	this	question	all	judges	
agreed	that	the	appeal	failed,	but	Kirby	J	added	lengthy	
comments	on	battered	woman	syndrome,	discussing	
issues about the accuracy of  its name, and its status as a 
scientific	phenomenon	on	which	expert	evidence	could	
reliably	be	given.	
In	considering	the	extent	to	which	the	manifestation	of 	
battered	woman	syndrome	is	culturally	specific,	Kirby	
J	referred	to	Ian	Freckelton’s	Brief:	‘Battered	Woman	
Syndrome’	(1992)	17	Alt LJ	39.	Reporting	on	Runjancic 
and Kontinnen v R	(1991)	53	A	Crim	R	262,	the	first	
case	in	which	evidence	of 	battered	woman	syndrome	
had	been	admitted	in	a	superior	court	in	Australia,	
Freckelton	discusses	the	extent	to	which	women	can	be	
assumed	to	react	in	a	particular	way	to	the	experience	
of 	living	in	a	violent	relationship.	He	notes	that:	
[t]he	danger	is	that	women	who	are	the	subject	of 	domestic	
violence	come	to	be	expected	to	exhibit	‘classic	signs’	of 	
battered	woman	syndrome	and	in	fact,	because	of 	their	
particular	personality	or	background,	do	not	fit	the	mould	
(for	instance	because	of 	their	cultural	background),	their	
attempts	to	mount	defence	of 	self-defence,	provocation	
and	duress	will	be	undermined.
Lawyer’s immunity
The	following	year	the	case	of 	Boland v Yates Property 
Corporation Pty Ltd	[1999]	HCA	64,	(1999)	167	
ALR	575	offered	the	High	Court	the	opportunity	to	
reconsider	the	scope	of 	its	decision	in	Giannarelli v 
ON MICHAEL KIRBY
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Wraith	[1988]	HCA	52,	(1988)	165	CLR	543,	in	which	
it	had	confirmed	the	legal	profession’s	immunity	from	
claims	of 	negligence	for	court-related	work.	Apart	from	
Kirby	J,	only	Gaudron	J	was	prepared	to	reconsider	
Giannarelli,	but	as	she	upheld	the	appeal	on	other	
grounds	she	felt	it	unnecessary	to	do	so.	
Although	Kirby	J	agreed	with	the	result	in	the	case,	
allowing	the	appeal	and	setting	aside	the	orders	of 	
the	Federal	Court,	he	was	alone	in	his	support	for	
the	Federal	Court’s	reservations	about	the	scope	of 	
the	High	Court’s	decision	in	Giannarelli.	Justice	Kirby	
referred	to	Simone	Brookes’	article,	‘Time	to	abolish	
lawyers’	immunity	from	suit’	(1999)	24	Alt LJ 175, the 
title	of 	which	states	clearly	Kirby	J’s	own	view.	Brookes’	
analysis	of 	the	advocates’	immunity	is	based	on	a	
comparison	with	the	liability	of 	medical	practitioners,	
an	analogy	rejected	by	McHugh	J	in	D’Orta-Ekenaike 
v Victoria Legal Aid	(below).	Justice	Kirby	referred	to	
Brookes	when	commenting	on	the	oft-noted	contrast	
between	the	‘ever	more	stringent	obligations	of 	care’	
imposed	on	other	professionals	and	‘the	immunity	
accorded	by	the	law	to	its	own’.	
Some years later, the case of  D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria 
Legal Aid	[2005]	HCA	12,	(2005)	223	CLR	1	gave	Kirby	
J the chance to restate his call to reconsider Giannarelli.	
After	committal,	trial,	conviction,	appeal,	re-trial	and	
acquittal	on	a	charge	of 	rape,	Mr	D’Orta-Ekenaike	sued	
his	lawyers,	who	relied	on	the	Giannarelli	immunity.	
Although	Gleeson	CJ,	Gummow,	Hayne	and	Heydon	
JJ	were	blunt	in	saying	‘Giannarelli should not be re-
opened’,	and	McHugh	J	was	of 	the	same	mind,	Kirby	
J	saw	the	issue	not	as	a	‘re-opening’	of 	Giannarelli, but 
as	a	necessary	clarification	of 	its	meaning	and	scope.	
In	a	long	and	detailed	analysis	Kirby	J	again	referred	to	
Brookes’	article.
Fresh evidence
In Re Sinanovic’s Application	[2001]	HCA	40,	(2001)	
180	ALR	448	Kirby	J	sat	alone	to	decide	whether	to	
give	leave	to	an	applicant	to	re-open	an	application	
for	special	leave	to	appeal	after	the	application	had	
previously	been	refused	by	Gummow	and	Callinan	JJ.	
The	applicant	was	illiterate,	indigent	and	incarcerated,	
and	Kirby	J	allowed	his	wife	to	speak	on	his	behalf.	The	
applicant	could	show	neither	exceptional	circumstances	
nor	fresh	evidence,	and	so	the	application	was	refused.	
In his decision Kirby J observed that a: 
good	instance	of 	the	discovery	of 	…	fresh	evidence	
recently	arose	in	[R v Button	[2001]	QCA	13,	where]	DNA	
evidence,	discovered	after	a	trial	and	before	the	hearing	of 	
the	appeal	in	that	Court,	conclusively	demonstrated	that	
the	prisoner	was	innocent,
and referred to a note about the case in (2001) 26 
Alternative	Law	Journal	97	at	97–98.	The	note	was	a	
contribution	by	Jeff 	Giddings	to	the	national	round-up	
column	DownUnderAllOver,	and	recounts	how	the	
Queensland	Court	of 	Appeal	released	a	man	on	the	
basis	of 	evidence	that	had	arisen	after	his	conviction.	
Free speech
In ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd	[2001]	HCA	63,	
(2001)	208	CLR	199	Kirby	J	agreed	with	the	result,	
allowing	an	appeal	against	the	decision	of 	the	Full	
Court	of 	the	Tasmanian	Supreme	Court	to	injunct	
the	ABC’s	screening	of 	a	television	program,	but	on	
different	grounds	from	the	majority.	Kirby	alone	found	
that	the	discretion	had	miscarried	because	it	‘was	
granted	without	appropriate	consideration	of 	the	
constitutional	principle	in	Lange	protecting	freedom	of 	
communication	concerning	governmental	and	political	
matters’.	The	other	judges	found	it	unnecessary	to	
decide	this	ground	of 	appeal.	
The	subject	matter	of 	the	television	program	was	
the	commercial	‘processing’	of 	brush-tailed	possums.	
Kirby	J	saw	this	as	being	within	the	scope	of 	the	
constitutional	principle	in	Lange,	saying	that	‘[t]he	
concerns	of 	a	governmental	and	political	character	
must	not	be	narrowly	confined’,	and	that	‘concerns	
about	animal	welfare	[and	the	export	of 	animals	and	
animal	products]	are	clearly	legitimate	matters	of 	public	
debate	across	the	nation’.	In	observing	that	‘[m]any	
advances	in	animal	welfare	have	occurred	only	because	
of 	public	debate	and	political	pressure	from	special	
interest	groups’,	Kirby	J	referred	to	an	article	by	one	
of 	the	McLibel	co-defendants,	Dave	Morris,	‘McLibel:	
do-it-yourself 	justice’	(1999)	24	Alt LJ	269.	In	the	article	
Morris	tells	the	story	of 	the	McDonald’s	Corporation’s	
infamous	suit	for	defamation	in	response	to	leaflets	that	
claimed	that	McDonald’s	caused	animal	suffering.
Asylum seekers
Re Woolleys	[2004]	HCA	49,	(2004)	225	CLR	1	was	
one	of 	the	many	asylum	seeker	cases	to	reach	the	High	
Court.	Four	Afghani	children,	held	with	their	parents	in	
Baxter	Immigration	Centre,	sought	orders	for	habeas	
corpus,	prohibition	and	injunction.	In	seven	separate	
opinions	the	High	Court	unanimously	dismissed	the	
application.	Kirby	J	agreed	that	children	were	lawfully	
detained,	saying	that	the	relevant	terms	of 	the	Migration 
Act	were	clear,	valid,	and	‘the	result	of 	a	deliberately	
devised	and	deliberately	maintained	policy	of 	the	
Parliament’.	In	noting	that	the	position	in	relation	to	
detention	of 	asylum	seekers	is	different	in	Europe,	
Kirby	J	referred	to	a	Brief 	on	asylum	seekers	by	Jane	
McAdam,	‘Australia	and	Europe	–	worlds	apart’	(2003)	
28 Alt LJ	193	in	which	McAdam	details	the	many	ways	in	
which	treatment	of 	asylum	seekers	was	more	humane	
in	Europe	than	in	Australia.	
In	each	of 	these	eight	decisions,	Kirby	J	referred	to	
material	in	the	Alternative	Law	Journal	to	support	
argument,	and	to	provide	background	and	detail.	His	
use	of 	the	Journal	illustrates	the	wide	range	of 	topics	it	
covers, from evidentiary rules and criminal defences to 
asylum	seekers	and	lawyers’	negligence,	and	shows	too	
the	useful	diversity	of 	ways	in	which	the	Journal	publishes	
material:	refereed	articles,	shorter	descriptive	‘briefs’,	
reporting	of 	current	issues,	and	editorial	opinions.
It	seems	apt	that	it	is	the	High	Court	judge	who	has	in	
his	decisions	been	most	attuned	to	the	effect	of 	law	on	
minority	groups	and	the	marginalised	who	has	found	
most	to	rely	on	in	Australia’s	‘alternative’	law	journal.		
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On 23 December last year, the Rudd Government 
tabled	in	Parliament	the	Honourable	John	Clarke’s	
Report	of 	the	Inquiry	into	the	Case	of 	Dr	Mohamed	
Haneef.1	In	fact,	it	tabled	only	Volume	One,	the	public	
report.	Volume	Two,	which	contains	what	Mr	Clarke	
describes	as	‘supplementary	material’	including	‘sensitive	
or	classified	material’,	was	not	tabled	and	has	not	yet	
been	made	public	(if 	it	ever	will	be).	Before	briefly	
considering	the	public	report’s	recommendations	and	
the	Government’s	response,	a	quick	run	down	of 	the	
details	of 	the	Haneef 	case	and	setting	up	and	conduct	
of 	the	Clarke	inquiry	will	be	provided.	
Dr	Mohamed	Haneef,	an	Indian	doctor	then	working	
at	the	Gold	Coast	hospital,	was	arrested	on	2	July	
2007	and	held	without	charge	for	12	days	under	
provisions	of 	Australia’s	anti-terrorism	legislation	(ss	
23DA, 23CB Crimes Act,).	On	14	July	he	was	charged	
under	s.102.7(2)	of 	the	Commonwealth Criminal Code 
with	the	offence	of 	recklessly	providing	support	to	a	
terrorist	organisation	on	the	grounds	that	his	mobile	
phone	Subscriber	Information	Module	(SIM)	card	
was	connected	to	failed	terrorist	attacks	in	Britain.	
Dr	Haneef 	was	granted	bail	by	a	Brisbane	magistrate	
two	days	after	being	charged,	but	within	hours	of 	the	
magistrate’s	ruling	the	then	Immigration	Minister	Kevin	
Andrews	cancelled	Haneef ’s	work	visa	because	he	
failed the character test under s 501(3) of  the Migration 
Act 1958	(Cth),	preventing	his	release	from	custody.	
The	following	day	Attorney-General	Philip	Ruddock	
issued	a	Criminal	Justice	Stay	Certificate	under	s	147	
of  the Migration Act	which	stopped	Haneef 	from	being	
deported	and	required	him	to	remain	in	detention	
while	the	criminal	proceedings	against	him	continued.	
Haneef 	was	held	in	immigration	detention	and	later	
home	detention	for	nearly	two	weeks.	On	27	July,	
the	Commonwealth	Director	of 	Public	Prosecutions	
withdrew	the	charge	against	Dr	Haneef 	on	the	basis	
that	there	was	insufficient	evidence	to	support	a	
conviction, and the Attorney-General cancelled the 
Criminal	Justice	Stay	Certificate.	He	was	allowed	to	
return	voluntarily	to	India	on	28	July	despite	his	visa	
remaining	cancelled.	Justice	Spender	of 	the	Federal	
Court set aside the visa cancellation decision on 21 
August	2007,	a	decision	upheld	by	the	Full	Bench	of 	the	
Federal	Court	in	December	2007	dismissing	an	appeal	
by	Minister	Andrews.2 
In March 2008 the Rudd Government announced 
that	a	judicial	inquiry	into	the	Haneef 	affair	would	
be	conducted	by	the	Honourable	John	Clarke	QC,	
a	retired	NSW	Supreme	Court	Judge.	At	the	top	
of 	its	terms	of 	reference,	the	inquiry	was	asked	to	
examine	and	report	on	‘the	arrest,	detention,	charging,	
prosecution	and	release	of 	Dr	Haneef,	the	cancellation	
of 	his	Australian	visa	and	issuing	of 	a	criminal	justice	
stay	certificate.’	Among	its	other	terms	of 	reference,	
the	Clarke	inquiry,	like	the	AFP-initiated	Street	
Review	into	the	failed	case	of 	terror	suspect	Izhar	Ul-
Haque3,	was	to	examine	and	report	on	improving	co-
operation,	co-ordination	and	‘interoperability’	between	
Commonwealth	agencies	including	the	AFP,	ASIO	and	
the	Commonwealth	Director	of 	Public	Prosecutions.	
The	Clarke	inquiry	was	for	the	most	part	conducted	
in	private	(the	opening	day	of 	the	inquiry	was	its	only	
public	hearing),	did	not	have	the	power	to	compel	
witnesses	to	give	evidence	or	face	cross-examination,	
and	witnesses	were	not	given	indemnity	against	
defamation	or	self-incrimination.	On	31	August	2008,	
the AFP announced that it had formally abandoned its 
investigation	of 	Dr	Mohamed	Haneef 	because	there	
was	no	evidence	against	him.	The	total	cost	of 	the	
AFP’s	investigation	of 	Haneef 	was	around	$8	million.4
In	all,	the	Clarke	inquiry	made	10	recommendations,	
the	most	important	of 	these	being	‘that	consideration	
be	given	to	the	appointment	of 	an	independent	
reviewer	of 	Commonwealth	counter-terrorism	laws.’	
Before	considering	this	recommendation	and	the	
Government’s	response	to	it	in	a	little	more	detail,	it	
should	be	noted	here	that	the	Clarke	Inquiry	report	
was	not	the	sole	counter-terrorism	document	tabled	
in	the	Federal	Parliament	on	23	December	2008.	On	
the same day, the Government also tabled, in the 
words	of 	Attorney-General	Robert	McClelland,	‘the	
Rudd	Government’s	comprehensive	response	to	
outstanding	reviews	of 	national	security	legislation	from	
the	term	of 	the	former	Government’.	Specifically,	the	
Government	responded	to	the	Australian	Law	Reform	
Commission’s	‘Fighting	Words:	A	Review	of 	Sedition	
Laws	in	Australia’	(tabled	13	September	2006),	the	
‘Review	of 	Security	and	Counter-Terrorism	Legislation’	
by	the	Parliamentary	Joint	Committee	on	Intelligence	
and Security (PJCIS) (tabled 4 December 2006) and 
the	PJCIS’s	‘Inquiry	into	the	proscription	of 	‘terrorist	
organisations’	under	the	Australian	Criminal	Code’	
which	had	been	tabled	on	20	September	2007.	
The	Government	accepted	the	Clarke	inquiry’s	
recommendation	to	give	consideration	to	the	
appointment	of 	an	independent	reviewer	of 	
Commonwealth	counter-terrorism	laws,	but	gave	its	
reasons	for	doing	so	in	its	Response	to	the	PJCIS’s	
‘Review	of	Security	and	Counter-Terrorism	Legislation’.5
The	PJCIS	review	called	for	the	‘Government	to	
appoint	an	independent	person	of 	high	standing	as	an	
Independent	Reviewer	of 	terrorism	law	in	Australia’,	
and	recommended	that	the	Independent	Reviewer	
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be	able	to	set	his	or	her	own	priorities	and	be	given	
access	to	all	‘necessary	information’.	The	Independent	
Reviewer	would	be	required	to	provide	an	annual	report	
to	Parliament.	In	a	related	recommendation,	the	PJCIS	
called for an amendment to the Intelligence Services 
Act 2001	(Cth)	requiring	the	PJCIS	to	examine	the	
Independent	Reviewer’s	reports	tabled	in	Parliament.	
In	its	response,	the	Government	stated	that	a	new	
statutory	office	in	the	Prime	Minister’s	Portfolio	
would	be	established	to	be	known	as	the	‘National	
Security	Legislation	Monitor’	who	would	be	required	
to	report	regularly	to	Parliament.	The	Monitor	would	
enable	ongoing	review	of 	national	security	laws	to	be	
conducted	in	a	more	comprehensive,	and	less	ad hoc 
and	piecemeal,	fashion	than	had	been	possible	in	the	
past.	This	would	in	turn	permit	‘ongoing	improvement’	
of 	the	laws.	
The	Government’s	acceptance	of 	this	recommendation	
is	to	be	commended.	Appointment	of 	an	independent 
Monitor by statute, and the requirement that they 
report	to	Parliament	on	a	regular	basis,	will	be	a	small	
but	hopefully	significant	first	step	towards	removal	of 	
the	ambiguities,	sloppy	definitions	and	catch-all	offences	
that	are	contained	in	Australia’s	counter-terrorism	laws	
and	which	made	possible	the	whole,	sorry	Haneef 	
‘affair’.	To	be	sure,	a	number	of 	these	issues	are	dealt	
with	on	a	largely	ad	hoc	basis	in	the	Government’s	
responses	to	the	PJCIS	and	Australian	Law	Reform	
Commission	inquiries	and	reviews	that	were	tabled	
on	the	same	day	as	the	Clarke	inquiry	report	and	
the	Government’s	response	to	it.	However,	as	the	
Government	acknowledged,	a	much	more	wholesale	
and	holistic	approach	to	the	reform	and	improvement	
of 	Australia’s	counter-terrorism	legislation	is	required	
than	could	be	adopted	by	these	inquiries	and	reviews.	
This	is	why	a	truly	independent	Monitor	of 	national	
security	legislation	is	needed.	
The	Monitor	cannot	simply	be	asked	to	wait	for	
referrals	by	parliamentary	committees	or	the	like	
before	setting	about	the	task	of 	reviewing	the	
legislation	and	recommending	improvements	to	bring	
it	more	into	line	with	human	rights,	due	process	and	
criminal	justice	standards.	Unfortunately,	the	Monitor	is	
no	substitute	for	the	political	will	required	to	put	her/
his	recommendations	and	improvements	into	effect.	
But	that	said,	the	creation	of 	the	office	should	at	least	
provide	a	reliable	rear	defence	when	political	will	has	to	
be demonstrated by the Government in Parliament and 
in	public	debate.	
Beyond	the	Clarke	inquiry	report	and	the	
Government’s	response	to	its	recommendations,	the	
Haneef 	case	is	important	in	other	key	respects.	It	
demonstrates	how	the	making	of 	a	crude	association	
between	Islam,	Muslims	and	terrorism	—	an	important	
element	of 	the	political	climate	created	by	the	
Howard	Government’s	counter-terrorism	legislation	
—	permitted	the	AFP	to	perpetrate	abuses	of 	human	
rights	and	due	process.	And	it	shows	how,	at	the	
very	time	when	social	cohesion	and	inclusiveness	—	
Australia’s	best	defence	against	home-grown	terrorist	
violence	—	is	most	required,	the	political	climate	and	
the	abuses	that	it	allowed	to	occur,	threatened	to	sow	
the	seeds	of 	division,	suspicion	and	cynicism	through	
the	Australian	community.	
For these reasons, Australia can ill afford to have a 
repeat	of 	the	Haneef 	affair.	The	appointment	of 	an	
independent	National	Security	Legislation	Monitor	
hopefully	will	not	only	bring	about	significant	and	much-
needed	improvements	to	Australia’s	counter-terrorism	
legislation,	it	may	also	avert	the	recurrence	of 	such	a	
debacle	in	future.
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When South Australia introduced the Prohibition 
of  Discrimination Act	(SA)	in	1966	it	was	at	the	
cutting	edge	of 	Australia’s	anti-discrimination	law	
—	this	was	the	very	first	piece	of 	anti-discrimination	
legislation	in	Australia.	However,	since	the	1960s	
South	Australia	has	fallen	to	the	back	of 	the	pack	
in	terms	of 	its	regulation	of 	discrimination.	No	
significant	amendments	have	been	made	to	the	Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) since the 1997 introduction 
of 	provisions	regarding	sexual	harassment.1 South 
Australia	is	now	one	of 	the	few	states	which	fail	
to	prohibit	discrimination	based	on	religious	belief,	
political	opinion	or	activity,	parental	status,	association	
with	a	child,	pregnancy	or	mental	illness.	
A	review	of 	the	Equal Opportunity Act 1984	(SA)	was	
commissioned	more	than	14	years	ago,	and	amending	
legislation	was	first	proposed	in	2002,	but	was	delayed	
as	a	result	of 	the	2002	state	elections.	Finally,	legislation	
was	proposed	in	2006	to	modernise	the	Act	‘to	ensure	
comprehensive	protection	of 	South	Australians	against	
unjustified	discrimination’.2	The	amending	legislation	
would	have	extended	prohibitions	on	discrimination	
to	cover	(among	other	things):	marital	status;	identity	
of 	a	spouse;	pregnancy;	association	with	a	child	
(including	breast	feeding);	caring	responsibilities;	
religious	appearance	or	dress,3 mental illness and non-
symptomatic	conditions	such	as	HIV.4 
However,	the	2006	Bill	didn’t	progress	far,	or	fast.	 
The	Liberal	party	and	Family	First	both	expressed	
strong	opposition	to	the	Bill.	The	second	reading	
debate	in	the	House	of 	Assembly	was	completed	
on	21	February	2007,	following	which	the	Bill	was	
referred	to	Committee.	The	Bill	dropped	off 	the	
notice	paper,	was	restored	on	1	May	2007,	and	lapsed	
again	due	to	the	prorogation	of 	parliament.	A	new	
version	of 	the	Bill	was	introduced	on	26	November	
2008.	The	2008	Bill	is	similar	to	the	previous	version,	
but some of  the more controversial amendments have 
been	reduced	or	removed.
The	delays	in	passing	these	important	amendments	
to	the	law,	and	the	reduction	in	the	scope	of 	the	
amendments	proposed,	are	both	cause	for	concern.	
Why	has	this	happened?	The	answer	appears	to	 
be	that	there	is	substantial	opposition	to	some	of 	 
the	amendments.
So, who is objecting to the amendments  
and why?
As	the	parliamentary	debates	on	the	2006	Bill	illustrate,	
there	were	a	number	of 	objections	being	made	to	the	
scope	and	nature	of 	the	proposed	amendments.	Many	
of 	these	objections	relate	to	the	fact	that	protection	
is	already	offered	to	victims	of 	particular	types	of 	
discrimination	under	Commonwealth	legislation,	or	
that	the	scope	of 	the	proposed	prohibitions	is	too	
broad.5	Not	all	of 	these	objections	will	be	considered	
here.	However,	it	is	interesting	to	consider	a	number	of 	
objections	to	the	proposed	amendments	expressed	by	
religious	groups.
Prior to the introduction of  the Bill in 2006 several 
Christian	religious	groups	in	South	Australia	expressed	
clear	objections	to	any	introduction	to	a	prohibition	on	
religious	discrimination	in	the	state.	In	a	2006	interview,	
Attorney-General	Michael	Atkinson	explained	the	
opposition	to	such	a	prohibition:	
the	main	Western	Christian	denominations,	the	Greek	
Orthodox	archdiocese	and	the	Greek	Evangelical	Church,	
opposed	it,	as	did	many	Christian	schools.	They	feared	the	
new	laws	would	prevent	them	from	freely	preaching	and	
practising	their	religion	and	from	seeking	to	convert	others.6
As	a	result	of 	such	objections	the	government	decided	
not	to	introduce	a	prohibition	of 	discrimination	based	
on	religion,	and	instead	proposed	a	limited	prohibition	
on	discrimination	based	on	religious	dress	or	
appearance	in	the	2006	Bill.	A	similarly	limited	provision	
appears	in	the	2008	version	of 	the	Bill.7 
However,	despite	the	limitation	in	the	scope	of 	
the	proposed	amendments	in	relation	to	religious	
discrimination, there remained substantial objection 
to	the	2006	Bill	from	some	religious	groups.	Many	of 	
these	objections	related	to	the	proposed	expansion	of 	
the	definition	of 	victimisation	to	include	engaging	in:
a	public	act	inciting	hatred,	serious	contempt	or	severe	
ridicule	of 	the	person	or	a	group	of 	persons	of 	which	the	
person	is	a	member	on	a	ground	of 	discrimination	that	is	
unlawful	by	virtue	of 	this	Act.8
Some	religious	groups	expressed	apprehension	that	
this	provision	would	allow	actions	be	taken	against	
religious	leaders	who	criticize	or	denounce	the	beliefs	
or	practices	of 	other	religious	groups.	
There	was	active	campaigning	on	this	issue.	For	
example,	a	search	of 	the	internet	revealed	several	
active	campaigns	against	the	2006	Bill	in	the	form	it	was	
proposed,	encouraging	individuals	to	contact	members	
of 	the	House	of 	Assembly	in	order	to	persuade	
them	that	passing	the	Bill	would	limit	free	speech	and	
freedom	of 	religion.	One	website	includes	a	template	
for	a	letter	writing	campaign	to	upper	house	MPs,	
which	reads	in	part	‘Please	vote	against	clause	61	of 	the	
Equal	Opportunity	(Miscellaneous)	Amendment	Bill	and	
other	parts	which	would	prevent	religious	institutions	
from	promoting	traditional	values.’9 
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demonstrates	concern	about	the	possibility	of 	a	‘Catch	
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Therefore,	this	particular	concern	appears	unfounded.
Despite	this,	the	proposed	expansion	of 	the	definition	
of 	victimisation	which	appeared	in	the	2006	Bill	has	
been	removed	from	the	2008	version.
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Despite	the	objections	made	to	these	provisions	in	the	
2006	Bill,	they	have	remained	in	the	2008	proposals.
Where to from here?
As	is	apparent	from	the	brief 	discussion	above,	there	
are	a	number	of 	specific	objections	being	made	to	the	
proposed	amendments	to	the	Equal Opportunity Act 
1984	(SA),	as	well	as	general	objections	to	its	scope.	
These	objections	appear	to	have	been	successful	in	
slowing	the	progress	of 	the	legislative	amendment	to	
date,	and	in	having	some	of 	the	proposed	amendments	
(especially	to	victimisation	provisions)	abandoned.	
Whatever	the	merit	of 	the	particular	objections,	it	
is	important	that	the	discussion	move	back	into	the	
public	arena.	Now	that	a	new	version	of 	the	amending	
legislation	has	been	tabled	in	parliament	the	time	is	ripe	
for	informed	public	debate	on	these	topics.		
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